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CHAPTER 5
President Bush’s Personal Retirement Accounts: Saving
or Dismantling Social Security1
KATHRYN L. MOORE
 Kathryn L. Moore is the Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law at the
University of Kentucky College of Law.
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§ 5.01 INTRODUCTION
President Bush has long been a proponent of investing a portion
of payroll taxes in the private sector.2 For example, in 1999, then-
Governor George Bush said to free-market crusader Stephen Moore,
“I just want you to know . . . that I’m really committed to these
1 This chapter draws from an earlier article written by this author. Kathryn L.
Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform 71 Temple L. Rev.
131 (1998). The author thanks Amy Osborne for her research assistance and Peter
Hislop for his comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. 
2 Cf. Richard W. Stevenson, For Bush, a Long Embrace of Social Security Plan,
New York Times 11 (Feb. 27, 2005) (noting that in a speech at the Midland Country
Club in the summer of 1978, Bush said that Social Security “will be bust in 10
years unless there are some changes. . .The ideal solution would be for Social
Security to be made sound and people given the chance to invest the money the
way they feel.”); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Private-Account Concept Grew from
Obscure Roots, Washington Post A01, 2005 WL 56302843 (Feb. 22, 2005) (noting
that Bush “had talked about private accounts as early as 1978 during his
unsuccessful run for the House of Representatives”). 
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private investment accounts.”3 In 2001, President Bush directed a
16-member bipartisan commission, the President’s Commission to
Strengthen Social Security, to formulate a plan for Social Security
reform that included voluntary personal retirement accounts.4 But
it was not until the beginning of his second term in office that
President Bush began in earnest his crusade5 to fundamentally
restructure Social Security.6 
President Bush devoted considerable attention to reforming
Social Security in his 2005 State of the Union address.7 In fact,
the New York Times titled its transcript of President Bush’s State
of the Union address, “We Must Pass Reforms that Solve the
Financial Problems of Social Security.”8 And, following his State
3 Karen Tumulty and Eric Roston, Is There Really A Crisis? Social Security
is a Long Way from Bankrupt, Despite the President’s Assertions. Why, Then, is
Bush Taking on America’s Biggest, Most Successful Social Program Ever?, Time
Magazine 22, 23 (Jan. 24, 2005). 
4 See President’s Comm’n to Strengthen Soc. Sec., Strengthening Social Security
and Creating Personal Wealth for All Americans 13 (Dec. 21, 2001)
(“Modernization must include individually controlled, voluntary personal retire-
ment accounts, which will augment the Social Security safety net.”). For a critique
of the Commission’s report, see, for example, Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the
Four “Truths of Personal Social Security Accounts: Evidence of 401(k) Plans,
81 N.C. L. Rev. 901 (2003); Peter A. Diamond and Peter R. Orszag, Assessing
the Plans Proposed by the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security,
96 Tax Notes 703 (July 29, 2002). 
5 Cf. Tumulty and Roston, supra note 3, at 28 (“Bush has promised to give G.O.P.
lawmakers the cover they need by spelling out the specifics of his plan and then
generating so much public support that opposing it will be the risky proposition.
‘I have an obligation to lead on this issue.’ ”). 
6 For purposes of this Article, the term Social Security is used to refer to cash
benefits provided by the United States’ Old-Age, Survivors’ and Disability
Insurance program. See Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security:
Misguided Reform, 71 Temple L. Rev. 131, 131 n.2 (1998) (citing authorities
showing that this is the generally accepted meaning of the term in the United
States). 
7 See “We Must Pass Reforms that Solve the Financial Problems of Social Secur-
ity,” New York Times A22 (Feb. 3, 2005) (transcript of President Bush’s State
of the Union address, as recorded by the New York Times) [hereinafter “State
of the Union address”]. 
8 State of the Union address, supra note 7. 
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of the Union address, President Bush began a blitz across the nation
to campaign for his fundamental reform of the system.9 
President Bush claims to respect Social Security and its funda-
mental values. In his 2005 State of the Union address, he declared
that “Social Security was a great moral success of the 20th century,
and we must honor its great purposes in this new century.”10 Citing
the system’s financial difficulties, he claimed that “we must join
together to strengthen and save Social Security.”11 Adding personal
security accounts, however, would do nothing to strengthen or save
Social Security. Instead, it would be the first and most significant
step toward dismantling the system.
§ 5.02 STEMMING THE DEFICIT
In its 2004 Annual Report,12 the Board of Trustees of the Social
Security Trust Funds predicts that contributions to the Social
Security system will exceed benefits paid by the system until
2018.13 Beginning in 2018, it predicts that Social Security will need
to draw down the assets held in the Social Security trust funds14
9 See Nell Henderson, Greenspan: Cut Social Security benefits: Deficits Threaten
Economy, Fed Chief Says, Lexington Herald-Leader A1, A1–A6 (March 3, 2005)
(“Bush has traveled to eight states since his State of the Union address a month
ago, with six more on his itinerary by the end of next week.”); David Cook, Bush
outlines second-term goals; Blitz to sell politically risky remake of Social Security
blasts off today, Christian Science Monitor 25 (Feb. 4, 2005), 2005 WL 58984942
(“Now the president and top officials from his administration are fanning out across
country to sell his message on Social Security. Today, Bush visits North Dakota,
Montana, and Nebraska. On Friday, the President will be in Arkansas and
Florida.”). 
10 State of the Union address, supra note 7. Similarly, in announcing the forma-
tion of the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security, on May 2, 2001,
President Bush said, “Social Security is one of the greatest achievements of the
American government, and one of the deepest commitments to the American
people.” See Remarks by the President in Social Security Announcement (May
2, 2001), available at www.csss.gov/press/press050201.html. 
11 State of the Union address, supra note 7. 
12 2004 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of Federal Old-Age and Survi-
vors Insurance and Disability Trust Funds [hereinafter 2004 Annual Report]. 
13 Id. at 8. 
14 Technically, there are two separate trust funds: the trust fund for the Old Age
and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program and the trust fund for the Disability
Insurance (DI) program. See, e.g., id. at 2. This chapter will refer to the combined
trust funds. 
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in order to pay full benefits, and the trust funds will be exhausted
by 2042.15 At that point in time, under present tax rates, it predicts
that contributions will only cover 73 percent of scheduled benefits
in 2042 and 68 percent of scheduled benefits in 2078.16 
President Bush has made much of this long-term deficit. In his
State of the Union address, he declared
The system, however, on its current path, is headed toward
bankruptcy. . . .
. . .
Thirteen years from now, in 2018, Social Security will be paying
out more than it takes in. And every year afterward will bring
a new shortfall, bigger than the year before.
For example, in the year 2027, the government will somehow
have to come up with an extra $200 billion to keep the system
afloat, and by 2033, the annual shortfall would be more than $300
billion. By the year 2042, the entire system would be exhausted
and bankrupt. If steps are not taken now to avert that outcome,
the only solutions would be dramatically higher taxes, massive
new borrowing, or sudden and severe cuts in Social Security
benefits or other government programs.
I recognize that 2018 and 2042 may seem a long way off. But
those dates aren’t so distant, as any parent will tell you. If you
have a 5-year-old, you’re already concerned about how you’ll
pay for college tuition 13 years down the road. If you’ve got
children in their 20’s, as some of us do, the idea of Social Security
collapsing before they retire does not seem like a small matter.
And it should not be a small matter to the United States
Congress.17 
President Bush is absolutely right that Social Security faces a
long-term deficit. President Bush, however, overstates his case by
completely ignoring the presence of the Social Security trust funds.
Indeed, President Bush’s depiction of Social Security’s long-term
deficit has been analogized to his claim about weapons of mass
15 Id. The Congressional Budget Office, in contrast, predicts that the Social Se-
curity trust fund will not be exhausted until 2052. 
16 2004 Annual Report, supra note 12, at 8. 
17 State of the Union address, supra note 7. 
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destruction.18 By the end of 2003, the Social Security trust funds
held $1,530.8 billion,19 and the trust funds are expected to continue
to grow for the next ten years or so.20 Beginning in 2018, the trust
funds will be required to redeem the government securities they
currently hold, and Social Security will cease to be a net lender
to the federal government’s general fund.21 Admittedly, this change
in cash flow between the Social Security trust funds and the federal
government’s general fund is likely to have important economic
and public policy implications,22 but that does not negate the
existence of the trust funds or the fact that the Social Security
system has been a net lender to the federal government for the last
twenty years or so.
In his State of the Union address, President Bush did not offer
a plan to solve Social Security’s long-term deficit. Rather, he left
all ideas, other than an increase in payroll tax rates, on the table
for Congress to consider. To a casual observer, President Bush may
have hinted that his personal security accounts would “fix” Social
Security’s long-term deficit. He introduced them immediately after
18 See, e.g., One Liners, Miami Herald L4, 2005 WLNR 2020703 (Feb. 13, 2005)
(“Our fearless leader is at it again. First it was WMDs, now it’s the bankruptcy
of Social Security. Let’s hope that Congress doesn’t fall for Bush’s cries of wolf
this time.”); Editorial, A New Term, But The Same Old Message From The People
Who Brought You Iraq, Now Social Security Reform! Phila. Daily News 19, 2005
WLNR 770683 (Jan. 19, 2005) (“Already, the Bush administration is ordering
Social Security Administration employees to paint the worst possible portrait of
the future of Social Security, to the dismay of workers who know that the Bush
message is full of hype. It’s a Bush game plan that worked during the start of
the Iraq War, when CIA analysts were browbeaten to give faulty information on
Saddam Hussein’s regime and his threat to the United States. We can hardly wait
for the Social Security equivalent to weapons of mass destruction.”); Letter,
Bellingham Herald (Wash.) 7, 2005 WLNR 741371 (Jan. 15, 2005) (“Social
Security is not broken. When President Bush and his mouthpieces tell us that, we
have to remember weapons of mass destruction and the mess in Iraq that he has
got us into.”); Republican divisions: Bush’s election euphoria has collided with
political reality, Fin. Times 10, 2005 WLNR 236893 (Jan. 8, 2005) (“Other critics
argue that Mr. Bush has still to make a convincing case for a future Social Security
deficit. They see a false urgency, similar to the administration’s presentation of
the case for invading Iraq over weapons of mass destruction.”). 
19 2004 Annual Report, supra note 12, at 4. 
20 See id. at 50 (noting that assets will grow through 2018). 
21 Id. at 51. 
22 Id. 
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discussing Social Security’s financial woes and the need for reform.
A careful review of his address, however, makes it clear that
President Bush never directly claimed that personal retirement
accounts would solve Social Security’s long-term deficit. In intro-
ducing the personal retirement accounts, President Bush simply
said, “As we fix Social Security, we also have the responsibility
to make the system a better deal for younger workers. And the best
way to reach that goal is through voluntary personal retirement
accounts.”23 He then offered a few comments on the accounts, but
never expressly claimed that personal security accounts would solve
Social Security’s long-term funding deficit.
A private White House memo to conservative allies confirms that
personal security accounts would not solve the deficit.24 In that
memo, Peter Wehner, President Bush’s director of strategic initia-
tives, declared “[w]e simply cannot solve the Social Security
problem with Personal Retirement Accounts alone. If the goal is
permanent solvency and sustainability — as we believe it should
be — then Personal Retirement Accounts, for all their virtues, are
insufficient to that task.”25 Indeed, depending on how they are
funded, personal retirement accounts could exacerbate, rather than
solve, Social Security’s long-term deficit because they impose
transition costs of at least $1 to $2 trillion.26 
Understanding the reasons for Social Security’s long-term deficit
helps explain why creating personal retirement accounts would not
solve the system’s long-term deficit. Although “delineating the
causes of the long-term deficit is somewhat arbitrary, since the
accounting can be done in many different ways,”27 at least three
23 State of the Union address, supra note 7. 
24 See Memo on Social Security, available at online.wsj.com/article/
0,,SB1104969956120181199,00.html. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. (describing transition costs as equal to $1 to $2 trillion). Cf. Social Security
Plan Backed, Deseret News B01, 2005 WLNR 3988642 (March 15, 2005) (stating
that transition costs “are expected to be $1.3 trillion over the next 10 years and
$3 trillion to $4 trillion in the 10 years after that”). 
27 Cf. Peter A. Diamond and Peter R. Orszag, Saving Social Security: A Bal-
anced Approach 55 (2004) (“Ultimately, delineating the causes of the long-term
deficit is somewhat arbitrary, since the accounting can be done in many different
ways.”). 
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factors contribute significantly to the system’s long-term deficit.28
First, life expectancy is increasing. When Social Security first
began to pay benefits in 1940, life expectancy at age 65 was 11.9
years for men and 13.4 years for women.29 By 2003, life expectancy
at age 65 had increased to 16.0 years for men and 19.0 years for
women.30 Moreover, the Social Security Board of Trustees predicts
that by 2025, 65 year old men will have a life expectancy of 17.4
years while 65 year old women will have a life expectancy of 20.0
years, and by 2080, 65 year old men will have a life expectancy
of 20.3 years while 65 year old women will have a life expectancy
of 22.9 years.31 Increasing life expectancy contributes to Social
Security’s long-term deficit because Social Security pays benefits
for life, and any increase in life expectancy at the age at which
benefits begins necessarily increases Social Security’s costs, unless,
of course, there is an offsetting reduction in benefits.32 
A second factor leading to Social Security’s long-term deficit is
the fact that the baby boom generation is reaching retirement age,33
and it is followed by a much smaller generation.34 The current
28 In introducing their plan to reform Social Security, Drs. Diamond and Orszag
also discuss three important factors contributing to Social Security’s long-term
deficit: (1) improvements in life expectancy, (2) increases in earnings inequality,
and (3) the burden of Social Security’s legacy debt. See Diamond and Orszag,
supra note 22, at 57–78. This article discusses the first and third of these factors,
but not the second. Rather than discussing increases in earnings inequality, the
article discusses the demographic shift resulting from the impending retirement
of the baby boom generation which is followed by a much smaller generation
because the Social Security Board of Trustees identifies that as an important factor
leading to Social Security’s increased costs. See 2004 Annual Report, supra note
12, at 3 (“Between about 2010 and 2030, OASDI cost will increase rapidly due
to the retirement of the large baby-boom generation. After 2030, increases in life
expectancy and relatively low fertility rates will continue to increase Social
Security system costs, but more slowly.”). 
29 2004 Annual Report, supra note 12, at 82 tbl. V.A.3. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. (using intermediate assumptions). 
32 See Diamond and Orszag, supra note 22, at 58–64 (explaining in detail how
increasing life expectancy contributes to Social Security’s long-term deficit). 
33 The eldest of the baby boom generation will reach age 62 (the earliest eligibil-
ity age for Social Security retirement benefits) in 2008. See U.S. Gen. Acct. Off.,
Social Security: Different Approaches for Addressing Program Solvency 18 (1998).
34 See American Academy of Actuaries, Financing the Retirement of Future Gen-
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Social Security system is financed principally on a pay-as-you-go
basis.35 That means that most current contributions are used to fund
current benefits, and thus current workers fund benefits for current
retirees. As the baby boom generation begins to retire, Social
Security’s costs will increase rapidly,36 but there will be fewer and
fewer workers to support those retirees. In 2003, there were 3.3
workers per Social Security beneficiary. In large part because of
this demographic shift,37 the Social Security Board of Trustee
predicts that by 2025, there will only be 2.3 workers per beneficiary
and by 2080, there will only be 1.9 workers per beneficiary.38 
The third, and perhaps most significant factor contributing to
Social Security’s long-term deficit is what Peter Diamond and Peter
Orszag refer to as the “legacy cost” or “legacy debt” of Social
Security.39 The legacy cost is the inevitable result of Social
Security’s traditional funding on a pay-as-you-go basis and its
reaching maturity (that is, all participants having contributed to the
system for their entire career).40 The first generation of retirees
erations: The Problem and Options for Change, Public Policy Monograph No. 1
6 (1998) (“Following World War II, there was a dramatic increase in fertility rates
in the United States. Rates began to soar in 1946 and, although they peaked in
1957, their effect on annual birth rates persisted until 1964. Following the post-war
increases, fertility rates plummeted and, since the early 1970s, have remained
below zero population growth.”). 
35 Currently, the system is operating with partial reserve financing; that is, the
system is currently running a surplus which will be used in later years to finance
benefits when promised benefits are expected to exceed contributions. See Robert
J. Myers, Social Security 390 (4th ed. 1993) (discussing partial reserve financing
resulting from 1977 and 1983 Acts amending Social Security). 
36 2004 Annual Report, supra note 12, at 46 (“The primary reason that the esti-
mated OASDI cost rate increases rapidly after 2010 is that the number of
beneficiaries is projected to increase more rapidly than the number of covered
workers. This occurs because the relatively large number of persons born during
the baby-boom will reach retirement age, and begin to receive benefits, while the
relatively small number of persons born during the subsequent period of low
fertility rates will comprise the labor force.”) 
37 For additional details on the demographic shift in the American population,
see, for example, Henry Aaron and John Shoven, Should the United States Privatize
Social Security? 8–11 (1999). 
38 2004 Annual Report, supra note 12, at 47 Table IV.B2 (using intermediate
assumptions). 
39 Diamond and Orszag, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
40 See Advisory Council of Social Security, Report Vol. I: Findings and Recom-
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under a pay-as-you-go system inevitably receive excessive benefits
relative to the amount they contribute to the program41 because they
only contribute to the program for a brief period of time yet receive
benefits throughout their entire retirement. Unlike in a funded
system, their benefits are not limited to the amount that could be
financed by their contributions plus earnings on their contributions.
Instead, they receive far more than they contribute to the system.42
The most dramatic illustration of this concept is Ida May Fuller,
the first beneficiary of monthly Social Security benefits.43 Miss
Fuller contributed a total of $24.7544 to the Social Security system
mendations 12 (1997) (“[F]rom now on many young workers and workers of future
generations under present law will be paying over their working lifetimes employee
and employer taxes that add considerably more than the present value of their
anticipated benefits. This is the inevitable result of a pay-as-you-go system such
as the United States has had, and an aging population.”); Carolyn L. Weaver, The
Crisis in Social Security: Economic and Political Origins 121–22 (1982) (“As
demographics (and the insurance status of workers) inevitably changed so as to
increase the proportion of beneficiaries to workers, it was believed [by opponents
of a pay-as-you-go system] that the increase in tax rates ultimately required to
buttress returns may well be politically unsustainable.”) 
41 Henry J. Aaron, Economic Effects of Social Security 41 (1982) (finding So-
cial Security operates as immature pay-as-you-go financing which provided
excessive benefits to initial recipients); Merton C. Bernstein & Joan Broadshaug
Bernstein, Social Security: The System That Works 235–36 (1988) (concluding
that Social Security’s excessive benefits to its initial participants are inevitable
in any pay-as-you-go system); Alicia H. Munnell, Comment [on World Bank
Study], in Social Security: What Role for the Future? 197 (Peter A. Diamond et
al. eds., 1996) (emphasizing inevitability that first generation does well in a pay-as-
you-go system). 
42 Determining rates of return under the current system is difficult because the
system is not a pure pay-as-you-go system. Rather benefits are calculated pursuant
to a complex benefit formula that is weighted so that low income workers receive
benefits equal to a higher percentage of their past wages than do higher income
workers, and disabled workers, and spouses and surviving spouses are also eligible
for benefits. Thus, an individual’s rate of return depends on more than simply when
the individual began contributing to the system. For a detailed discussion of rates
of return under the current system and the complexity involved in calculating them,
see General Accounting Office, Social Security: Issues in Comparing Rates of
Return With Market Investments, GAO/HEHS-99-110 22–31 (Aug. 1999). 
43 See The First Social Security Beneficiary, History Page: Brief History, avail-
able at www.ssa.gov/history/imf.html. 
44 See President’s Comm’n to Strengthen Soc. Sec., supra note 4, at 5 (“For
years the Social Security Administration would distribute photographs of Ida May
Fuller of Ludlow, Vermont, who having paid $24.75 in Social Security taxes live
to age 100 and collected $22,889 in benefits.”). 
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over a period of little less than three years and was issued her first
benefit check of $22.54 on January, 31, 1940.45 Living until the
age of 100, Miss Fuller received over $20,000 in benefits during
her 35 years as a beneficiary.46 
There is nothing new or surprising about this legacy cost. Social
Security’s architects were well aware of this phenomenon.47 In fact,
Congress expressly converted Social Security to a pay-as-you-go
system in 193948 because it permitted Congress to pay the first
generation of retirees more than they paid into the system.49 Indeed,
the 1937-38 Social Security Advisory Council warned:
The planning of the old-age insurance program must take full
account of the fact that, while disbursements for benefits are
relatively small in the early years of the program, far greater total
disbursements are inevitable in the future. No benefits should be
promised or implied which cannot be safely financed not only
in the early years of the program but when workers now young
will be old.50 
45 Id. 
46 A Brief History of Social Security Issued on Social Security’s 65th Anniver-
sary, SSA Publication No. 21-059 7–8 (August 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/
history/reports/briefhistory.html. 
47 See Report to the President of the Committee Economic Security, reprinted
in Report of the Committee on Economic Security of 1935, and other Basic
Documents Relating to the Development of the Social Security Act 33 (50th Ann.
ed. 1985) (“Benefit payments will be light in the early years, but will increase
steadily until by 1965 they will exceed the annual receipts.”) 
48 For a discussion of the history of the funding of the Social Security system,
see Moore, supra note 6, at 139–40. 
49 See Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social Security 26 (1966)
(noting that technical staff presented plan that permitted reasonably adequately
benefits to be paid to workers reaching retirement age in early years of the program
by “using some of the current receipts to pay the cost in excess of the contributions
which had been paid on behalf of these workers.”); Final Report of 1937-1938
Advisory Council on Social Security, reprinted in Report of the Committee, supra
note 42, at 173, 187 (“The policy of paying higher benefits to persons retiring
in the earlier years of the system than are the equivalent of individual contributions
is already established in the present act. Such a policy is not only sound social
insurance practice but has long been recognized as necessary in private pension
programs. Only through the payment of reasonable benefits can older workers be
retired.”). 
50 Final Report of the 1937-1938 Advisory Council on Social Security, reprinted
in Report of the Committee, supra note 42, at 173, 199. 
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Regardless of how one may now feel about this legacy cost,51
it exists, and creating personal security accounts does absolutely
nothing to eliminate it. The legacy cost arises from past transfers
to the first generation of Social Security beneficiaries52 and simply
cannot be recouped by creating personal security accounts. Simi-
larly, creating personal security accounts does not decrease life
expectancy or change the country’s basic demographic structure.
Thus, creating personal retirement accounts cannot and does not
eliminate Social Security’s long-term deficit.
§ 5.03 IMPROVING RATES OF RETURN
Although the White House concedes that personal security
accounts would not eliminate Social Security’s long-term deficit,
President Bush, like many proponents of personal security ac-
counts,53 contends that they would increase Social Security’s rate
51 Aaron and Shoven, supra note 32, at 70 (“Debates on whether those decisions
were wise or foolish will, doubtlessly, occupy scholars for many years.”). For a
defense of the legacy cost, see, Diamond and Orszag, supra note 22, at 69–70
(“It was a humane response to suffering imposed by World War I, the Great
Depression, and World War II on Americans who came of age during those years,
and it helped to reduce unacceptably high rates of poverty among them in old
age. Moreover, the higher benefits not only helped the recipients themselves but
also relieved part of the burden on their family and friends, and on the taxpayers
of that era, who would otherwise have contributed more to their support.”). 
52 Social Security’s legacy cost actually accumulated over several generations
because benefits were continually increased and coverage extended in the years
after the enactment of Social Security. See Diamond and Orszag, supra note 22,
at 7 (“in reality, [Social Security’s legacy] debt accumulated over several
generations”); Moore, supra note 6, at 144 nn.78–79 (explaining why continually
increasing benefits and extending coverage permits system to provide participants
with benefits that exceed their contributions). 
53 See, e.g., Advisory Council Report, Vol. 1, supra note 35, at 104 (“Under
present law, the average real rate of return on Social Security taxes is projected
to fall to about 2% on average for workers reaching age 65 in 2020, and to level
out at 1 to 2% on average for younger workers and future generations. This is
substantially below the real return to private capital investment, which is estimated
to be on the order of 9.3% for society as a whole on a pre-tax basis, or 5.4%
net of corporate income taxes.”); Steve Forbes, How to Replace Social Security,
The Wall Street Journal A20 (Dec. 18, 1996) (“the average worker retiring today
receives a lifetime return of only about 2.2 percent on the taxes he has paid into
the system. . . Contrast this with the historic 9% to 10% annual returns from stock
market investments . . .The advantages of an IRA-type approach are overwhelm-
ing.”) 
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of return. In his 2005 State of the Union address, President Bush
said, “Here is why personal accounts are a better deal. Your money
will grow, over time, at a greater rate than anything the current
system can deliver, and your account will provide money for
retirement over and above the check you will receive from Social
Security.”54 
Before an audience at Catholic University, Vice President Cheney
elaborated,
Young workers who elect personal accounts can expect to receive
a far higher rate of return on their money than the current system
could ever afford to pay them. . . . . For example, if a 25-year-
old invested $1,000 per year over 40 years at Social Security’s
2 percent rate of return, in 40 years she would have over $61,000.
But if she invested the money in the stock market, earning even
its lowest historical rate of return, she would earn more than
double that amount — $160,000.55 
There is no doubt that Social Security’s projected rates of return
for future generations of retirees56 are lower than the historical
average real return on U.S. equities, which is about 7 percent.57
As discussed in the preceding section, Social Security provided
workers with very high rates of return in its early years because
it was an immature pay-as-you-go system. Now that the system has
reached maturity, Social Security can no longer provide such rates
of return.58 Moreover, given the aging of the American population,
54 See State of the Union Address, supra note 7. 
55 Jim VandeHei and Jonathan Weisman, Partisan Social Security Claims Ques-
tioned; Budget Experts Say Both Sides Flawed, Washington Post A05, 2005 WL
56304055 (Feb. 27, 2005). 
56 “The Social Security Administration estimates that with the 10.6 percent tax
rate and the benefits projected in current law, an individual joining the work force
today would receive an implicit real rate of return of only about 2.5 percent.”
Martin Feldstein, Structural Reform of Social Security, NBER Working Paper
11098 5 (Feb. 2005), citing Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary,
Estimated Real Internal Rates of Return on Taxes for Social Security Benefits for
Cohorts Born 1982-86 (May 17, 2001). 
57 Peter A. Diamond, What Stock Market Returns to Expect for the Future?,
63 Soc. Sec. Bull. 38, 39 (No. 2 2000) (“Over the past 200 years, stocks have
produced a real return of 7.0 percent per year.”). 
58 See John Geanakoplos, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Stephen Zeldes, Social Secur-
ity Money’s Worth, in Prospects for Social Security Reform 79, 86 (Olivia S.
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Social Security’s rates of return may in fact be negative for future
generations.59 
Just as the large net transfers to the early generations were the
inevitable result of Social Security’s traditional funding on a pay-as-
you-go basis, these lower rates of return are an inevitable result
of the economics of a pay-as-you-go system and our aging popula-
tion. In a pure pay-as-you go system,60 retirees will receive a return
on their contributions equal to the growth in real wages, if the
population and tax rate remain constant over time.61 If, however,
the working population shrinks vis-à-vis the retired population, as
it is in the United States today and will for the foreseeable future,
a pay-as-you-go system can only finance benefits equal to a
decreasing percentage of average wages.62 
Nevertheless, comparing the current system’s rates of return with
the historic rates of return on U.S. capital markets is inappropriate
for at least two reasons.63 First, and perhaps most significantly, such
Mitchell, Robert J. Myers, and Howard Young eds., 1999) (“It must be emphasized
that these deteriorating money’s worth patterns appear even though we hold
constant life expectancy and the age structure of the population. That is, falling
money’s worth in this model is not due to the aging of the baby boomers, increased
life expectancy, or massive administrative inefficiency, but rather to the simple
arithmetic of the pay-as-you-go system.”). 
59 See, e.g., Steurle & Bajika, How Social Security Redistributes Income, 62
Tax Notes 1763, 1770 (1994) (“Lifetime contributions begin to exceed lifetime
benefits for high-wage single males retiring in the 1980s. Positive net transfers
are eliminated for high/average wage two-earner couples retiring after the turn
of the century. [H]igh-wage single workers and two-earner couples retiring in the
2020s and later will face very large negative transfers (or positive net lifetime
taxes) from the system.”). 
60 Although Social Security is not a pure pay-as-you-go system, it is funded
principally on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
61 The following formula explains this phenomenon. Assume that w is the aver-
age covered money wage, W is the number of covered workers, R is the number
of retirees drawing benefits, and t is the payroll tax. A total of twW will be paid
into the system, which can finance an average benefit payment of tw(W/R). In
a stable population, W/R will be constant over time. Thus, a fixed payroll tax rate
will be able to finance benefits equal to a fixed percentage of average wages. See
Moore, supra note 6, at 143 n.73 and authorities cited therein. 
62 Applying the preceding formula, in a shrinking population, W/R will decrease
over time unless real wages generate adequately larger contributions. Thus, a fixed
payroll tax rate will only be able to finance benefits equal to a decreasing
percentage of average wages. Id. at 143 n.74. 
63 Regina Jefferson offers two additional reasons why such raw comparisons
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a raw comparison fails to take into account the costs involved in
converting from the current pay-as-you-go system to a pre-funded
system. These costs, often referred to as transition costs, are the
inevitable result of the current system’s legacy debt.64 Regardless
of how the transition costs are funded, they inevitably lower the
rates of return for the individuals who bear those costs. Indeed,
economists John Geanakoplos, Olivia Mitchell, and Stephen Zeldes
have shown that if a mature, pay-as-you system were shut down
and new payroll taxes were invested in the private market and
explicit debt were issued to replace the unfunded promised benefits,
after-tax returns on individual accounts would be identical to the
low returns received under the old system.65 
Second, raw comparisons between rates of return under the
current system and a system of personal security accounts fail to
take into account administrative costs. The current Social Security
system is administered in an extremely efficient manner, with
administrative expenses only about one percent of total expendi-
tures.66 Administrative costs under a system of personal security
accounts would undoubtedly be higher,67 though how much higher
are inappropriate. First, most workers would be well-advised to invest in a
diversified portfolio which would include assets other than securities and the
average rate of return on such portfolios would be lower than that of the stock
market. Second, calculations of Social Security’s rates of return often exclude the
system’s disability and survivor benefits. See Regina T. Jefferson, Privatization:
Not the Answer for Social Security Reform, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1287, 1321–23
(2001).  
The General Accounting Office offer yet three more reasons why such
comparisons are misleading. First, such comparisons do not capture the annuity
costs involved in system of private accounts. “Second, future returns on both
market investments and Social Security as it is now structured may not be the
same as in the past, and the gap between those returns may narrow. Third, risks
differ between the current Social Security program and private market invest-
ments.” General Accounting Office, supra note 37, at 40. 
64 Geanakoplos, Mitchell, & Zeldes, supra note 53, at 84 (“one extremely impor-
tant reason that our social security system imposes such a burden on today’s young
is that the system transferred a great deal of wealth to the generations retiring
just after the Great Depression.”) 
65 See id. at 88–96. 
66 2004 Annual Report, supra note 12, at 4. If administrative expenses for the
disability insurance program are excluded, administrative expenses fall to about
0.6 percent of expenditures. Id. 
67 See Aaron and Shoven, supra note 32, at 80 (noting that most efficient ap-
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depends on how the system is structured.68 According a 1999
General Accounting Office (GAO)69 Report, estimates of adminis-
trative costs for a centralized system of personal accounts range
from 0.1 percent to 2 percent of assets while estimates for a
decentralized employer-sponsored system range from 0.28 percent
to 3.0 percent of assets; although, the GAO believes that these
figures may underestimate expenses.70 Such administrative ex-
penses could significantly decrease the value of a personal account
over time. For example, an annual fee of one percent of assets could
reduce the accumulated balance in a personal security account by
20 percent over a 40 year career.71 
§ 5.04 VICISSITUDES OF LIFE AND OF THE MARKET
Even if personal security accounts could increase Social Securi-
ty’s rates of return, it would not be the creation of the personal
retirement accounts themselves that would increase the rates of
return. Rather, it would be the pre-funding and diversification of
investments that would accompany such accounts that would
increase the rates of return.72 Personal security accounts, however,
proach to personal accounts “is estimated to cost [Social Security Administration]
as much per person to handle these transactions as the current system does. In
short, the most efficient privatization option would approximately double employ-
ment in the Social Security Administration!”). 
68 See Patrick J. Purcell, Social Security Individual Accounts and Employer-
Sponsored Pensions, CRS Report for Congress RL020305 (Feb. 3, 2005) (discuss-
ing various option and administrative costs involved in establishing a system of
personal accounts); Karen C. Burke and Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privatizing
Social Security: Administrative and Implementation, 58 Wash. and Lee L. Rev.
1325 (2001) (discussing administrative issues involved in system of personal
accounts). 
69 Effective July 7, 2004, the GAO’s legal name became the Government Ac-
countability Office. See GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-
271, 118 Stat. 811 (2004). 
70 See U.S. Gen. Acc. Office, Social Security Reform: Administrative Costs for
Individual Accounts Depend on System Design, Report to the Ranking Minority
Member, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, GAO/HEHS-
99-131 12–18 (June 1999). 
71 See Peter A. Diamond, The Economics of Social Security Reform, in Framing
the Social Security Debate 38, 54 (R. Douglas Arnold, et al. eds., 1998). 
72 See General Accounting Office, supra note 37, at 15 n.3 (Aug. 1999) (noting
that only prefunding and diversification “would be necessary to improve rates of
return”). 
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need not be created in order to pre-fund Social Security benefits
or diversify investments.73 
Although Social Security is funded principally on a pay-as-
you-go basis, it is currently running a surplus. Under current law,
that surplus must be invested in U.S. Government bonds.74 If the
law were changed to permit a portion of the Social Security trust
funds to be invested in the private market, they could, at least in
theory, reap the same, or perhaps even higher,75 rates of return from
such investments than a system of private accounts.76 Indeed, in
recent years a number of analysts77 and policymakers78 have
73 Similarly, in theory, Social Security could be converted to a system of per-
sonal security accounts without pre-funding or diversifying investments. Indeed,
Latvia established a privatized but unfunded public pension system in which payroll
taxes are collected by the government and credited to workers’ “notional” accounts
with paper returns on contributions. See John Geanakoplos et al., Would a
Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return?, in Framing
the Social Security Debate 137, 141 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998). President
Bush, however, clearly has no interest in such a system. 
74 42 U.S.C. § 401(d) (“Such investments may be made only in interest-bearing
obligations of the United States or in obligations guaranteed as to both principal
and interest by the United States.”). 
75 Arguably the returns would be even higher than under a system of individual
accounts because administrative costs would be lower. See Diamond and Orszag,
supra note 22, at 215. 
76 Diamond and Orszag, supra note 22, at 214 (“Any benefits from a diversified
portfolio within an individual accounts system could in principle also be achieved
through investments by the Social Security trust fund itself.”). 
77 See, e.g., Bob Ball, Insuring the Essentials: Bob Ball on Social Security 233–41;
(2000); Henry J Aaron and Robert D. Reischauer, Countdown to Reform 113–14
(1998). 
78 Cf. Clinton Fiscal 2001 Budget Plan Includes Equity Investment of Social
Security Assets, 27 Pens. & Bene. Rep. (BNA) 466, 466 (2000) (“The Clinton
administration’s fiscal 2001 budget proposal, transmitted to Congress Feb. 7,
revisits the idea of investing Social Security Trust assets in equities, a proposal
the administration dropped last year after it proved too controversial to garner
bipartisan support.”); Douglas E. Elmendorf, Jeffrey B. Liebman, and David W.
Wilcox, Fiscal Policy and Social Security Policy during the 1990s, in American
Economic Policy in the 1990s 61, 91–106 (Jeffrey Frankel and Peter Orszag eds.,
2002) (describing Clinton Administration’s proposal to allow stock market
investments by the trust fund); I Advisory Council Report, supra note 35, at 25
(one of three different reforms proposed by Advisory Council, the “maintain
benefits plan,” urges further study and examination of a plan to invest OASDI
trust fund monies in the equity market). 
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proposed that the law be changed to permit the investment of a
portion of the reserve in equities.79 President Bush, however, has
no interest in such a proposal. Instead, he is firmly committed to
the creation of personal accounts.
Permitting investment in the private market through personal
accounts rather than through the trust fund would fundamentally
alter the nature of the Social Security system. Specifically, it would
shift investment risk from the federal government to individual
workers.
As part of his public campaign to reform Social Security,
President Bush told an audience in Louisville, Kentucky, “I believe
everybody has the capability of being in the investor class. I like
the idea of people opening up their statements on a quarterly basis
and watching their asset base grow.”80 According to a British
weekly journal:
The notion that changing social security would be one of Bush’s
vehicles of greatness began and developed into another ideologi-
cal issue when he was governor of Texas; the story was told then
that the caretaker of a court building in Galveston had made no
less than $750 [million] from dabbling in stocks and shares.81
79 Of course, such proposals raise “difficult issues of corporate governance and
potential political interference in capital markets.” Elmendorf et al., supra note
73, at 99. See also Charles P. Blahous III, Reforming Social Security: For Ourselves
and Our Posterity 135 (2000) (objecting to trust fund investing in private market
as “intolerable to our free economic traditions and to our political tradition of
seeking to avoid corrupting admixtures of political and economic power”);
Diamond and Orszag, supra note 22, at 215 (noting that “[o]ne of the most
commonly raised concerns about trust fund investment in stocks involves corporate
governance.”).  
For analyses of the wisdom of investing the Social Security trust fund in the
private equities market, see authorities cited in Kathryn L. Moore, Partial
Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on Women, Minorities, and
Lower-Income Workers, 65 Missouri L. Rev. 341, 351 n. 42 (2000). 
80 Ryan Alessi, His solution: private accounts: Campaign targets younger work-
ers, Lexington Herald-Leader A1, A1 (March 11, 2005). 
81 Stephen Andrew, america, New Statesman 19, 2005 WLNR 1383629 (Jan.
24, 2005).  
Time Magazine offers a slightly different spin on this legend. It reports that
Bush’s advisors say that as Governor, “he was struck by the experiences of local
governments in places like Galveston County that had allowed their employees
to opt out of government retirement plans and invest the proceeds in private funds
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While this legend may make a system of personal accounts sound
appealing, stock investments do not always grow. For every
legendary three-quarter millionaire courthouse caretaker, there is
at least one former Enron employee who lost most or all of his or
her retirement savings when Enron went bankrupt.82 
When signing the Social Security Act into law on August 14,
1935, President Roosevelt declared,
We can never insure one hundred percent of the population
against one hundred percent of the hazards and vicissitudes of
life, but we have tried to frame a law which will give some
measure of protection to the average citizen and to his family
against the loss of a job and against poverty-ridden old age.83
Rather than protecting individuals from the vicissitudes of life,
a system of personal security accounts would subject individuals
to the vicissitudes of the stock market.
Enron stock most dramatically illustrates the vicissitudes of the
stock market. In January 2000, Enron stock sold for about $40 per
— yielding legends of courthouse janitors with $750,000 nest eggs.” Tumulty and
Roston, supra note 3, at 25.  
It is indeed true that the county of Galveston, Texas, opted out of the Social
Security system on January 1, 1981. It may also be true that a Galveston county
courthouse janitor retired with a $750,000 nest gathered from investing in the stock
market. There does not, however, appear to be any truth in the claim that the
$750,000 was provided through the Galveston plan. Indeed, the Galveston plan
prohibits participants from investing in common stocks. Instead, the Galveston plan
provides that the county, rather than individual participants, decides how funds
should be invested, and it has followed a very conservative investment strategy
investing in Group Fixed Annuity Contracts issued through the American United
Life Insurance Company. See Wilson, at 49. See also General Accounting Office,
Social Security Reform: Experience of the Alternate Plans in Texas, GAO/HEHS-
99-31 8–9 (Feb. 1999) (“The Alternate Plans were designed to give the employees
a guaranteed nominal annual return on their contributions of at least 4 percent.
Therefore, the Alternate Plans’ managers contracted with an insurance company
to purchase an annuity that guaranteed the minimum return. The portfolios holding
the plans’ contributions are invested only in fixed-rate marketable securities
(government bonds, corporate bonds, and preferred stocks) and bank certificates
of deposit.”) 
82 Susan J. Stabile, Enron, Global Grossing, and Beyond: Implications for Work-
ers, 76 St. John’s L. Rev. 815, 824 (2002) (noting that “many [Enron employees]
lost between seventy and ninety percent of their retirement funds”). 
83 Presidential Statement Signing the Social Security Act. August 14, 1935, Re-
port of the Committee, supra note 42, at 145, 145. 
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share.84 It reached a high of about $90 per share in late 2000 and
fell to $.46 per share by the end of November 2001.85 In fact, the
share price slid 85 percent in a single day in late November 2001.86
President Bush could protect workers from some of the volatility
of the stock market by prohibiting workers from investing their
personal retirement accounts in individual stocks. Indeed, his State
of the Union address, President Bush said, “We will make sure the
money can only go into a conservative mix of bonds and stock
funds.”87 
Limiting investments to stock funds, rather than individual
stocks, cannot protect participants from all of the volatility of the
market. To illustrate, in 1995, the annual return on S&P 500 stocks
was 37.43 percent while the annual return in 2002 was -22.10
percent.88 Although the stock market has been remarkably stable
over very long periods of time, 89 it has been much more volatile
over shorter periods of time. For example, from 1953 to 1972, the
real rate of return on the S&P 500 averaged 9.1 percent while over
the twenty year period beginning just two years later in 1955, the
real rate of return only averaged 4.2 percent, less than half that of
the preceding period.90 Stock prices did not rise at all during the
1970s, and it took the S&P 500 fifteen years to regain its 1968 value
in real terms.91 
Building on the volatility of the stock market, Henry Aaron and
Robert Reischauer have shown how variable replacement rates, that
is the ratio of pensions to prior earnings, can be under a system
of private accounts. According to calculations that assume that the
average male worker invests a constant percentage of his wages
84 See Enron fights for life after bid collapse, BBC News (Nov. 29, 2001), avail-
able at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1681522.stm. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 State of the Union address, supra note 7. 
88 William Reichenstein, 10 Lessons You Should Learn From Recent Market
History, AAII Journal 3, 4 Table 1 (Feb. 2003) 
89 Diamond, supra note 52, at 39. (“Even though annual returns fluctuate enor-
mously, and rates vary significantly over periods of a decade or two, the return
on stocks over very long periods has been quite stable.”). 
90 General Accounting Office, supra note 37, at 33. 
91 Elmendorf, et al., supra note 73, at 97. 
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in a “total stock market” index fund during his working years and
converts the balance into an annuity at age 62, workers who reached
age 62 in 1969 would have enjoyed a replacement rate of more
than 100 percent (104 percent) of prior earnings, while those
reaching 62 in 1975 would have received a replacement rate of only
39 percent.92 
§ 5.05 THREE-LEGGED STOOL
Although volatility is an inevitable element of investing in the
stock market, and stocks should probably, at least in theory, play
a role in everyone’s retirement income portfolio, individual invest-
ment risk has no place in Social Security.93 Social Security was
never intended to be the sole source of retirement income. Rather,
Social Security was designed to “[s]erve as a floor of protection
on which private-sector economic-security measures can be
built.”94 
Our national retirement income system is often described as a
three-legged stool, with Social Security one leg of the stool,
employer-sponsored retirement plans a second leg, and individual
savings the third leg.95 For individuals who can afford to and do
92 Aaron and Reischauer, supra note 72, at 35. 
93 The question, one should be clear, is not whether saving in defined contribu-
tion plans and other private individual accounts is desirable. The question is
whether the core program of income protection, instituted and still justified to
assure an adequate income after retirement disability or death of an earner, should
retain the shape and structure of Social Security or be converted, in whole or in
part, to a defined contribution plan.  
Aaron and Shoven, supra note 32, at 57. 
94 Myers, supra note 30, at 231. In a radio address on the third anniversary
of the Social Security Act, President Roosevelt said:  
The Act does not offer anyone, either individually or collectively, an easy life
— nor was it ever intended so to do. None of the sums of money paid out to
individuals in assistance or insurance will spell anything approaching abundance.
But they will furnish that minimum necessary to keep a foothold; and that is the
kind of protection Americans want.  
Radio Address on the Third Anniversary of the Social Security Act. August 15,
1938, in Report of the Committee, supra note 42, at 146, 148. 
95 Christopher Bone, An Actuarial Perspective on How Social Security Reform
Could Influence Employer-Sponsored Pensions, in Prospects for Social Security
Reform 333, 333 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1999) 
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save for retirement on their own initiative, individual investment
risk is an inevitable element of the third leg of the retirement stool.
Moreover, individual investment risk is increasingly common in the
second leg of the retirement stool as employers shift from defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans.96 
Individual investment risk, however, should play no role whatso-
ever in Social Security. Social Security was “designed to prevent
destitution and dependency,”97 and it has been enormously success-
ful in that role.98 When Social Security was enacted, about fifty
percent of the elderly population lived in poverty.99 “The poor-
house, toward the end of life, with all its horrors, was a very real
part of America.”100 
Today, in contrast, only 8.5 percent of Social Security beneficia-
ries aged 65 or older have a total income that falls below the poverty
line.101 Without Social Security, though, the income of 48 percent
of such beneficiaries would fall below the poverty line.102
96 For a detailed history of the shift from defined benefit plans to defined contri-
bution plans, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114
Yale L. J. 451 (2004). See also Jefferson, supra note 58, at 1304–06 (discussing
reasons for shift). 
97 Report of the Committee on Economic Security, in Report of the Committee,
supra note 42, at 1, 33. See also June E. O’Neill, Why Social Security Needs
Fundamental Reform, 65 Ohio State L. J. 79, 89 (2004) (“Originally, the primary
goal of Social Security, as stated in various government reports and presidential
speeches, was to alleviate poverty among the elderly.”). 
98 See Joseph F. Quinn, Criteria for Evaluating Social Security Reform, in Pros-
pects for Reform, supra note, at 44–45 (“One of the program’s greatest accomplish-
ments has been the dramatic reduction in elderly poverty, from about 30 percent
(and twice the national average) in 1967, to half that rate only seven years later,
following large increases in real social security benefits beginning in 1968. . . .
Since 1982, the elderly poverty rate has been slightly below that of the entire
population.”) 
99 See Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social Security Work for Women and
Men, 16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 359, 365–66 (1999). Cf. Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 643 n.8 (1937) (“The Senate Committee estimated, when investigat-
ing the present act, that over one half of the people in the United States over 65
years of age are dependent upon others for support.”). 
100 Ball, supra note 72, at 12 (noting that only about six million Americans
had jobs with pension coverage and only about 300,000 to 400,000 actually
received a pension). 
101 Soc. Sec. Admin., Income of the Population 55 or Older, 139 Tbl. 8.1 (2000).
102 Id. at 148, Tbl. 8.3. 
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Individual investment risk would undercut Social Security’s ability
to provide individuals with stable, dependable pensions103 and thus
individual investment risk should play no role in our country’s core
retirement program.104 
§ 5.06 DISMANTLING SOCIAL SECURITY
Some may argue that creating personal security accounts would
simply be an incremental step in the current shift from defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans.105 The White House,
however, recognizes the magnitude of its proposed change. In his
private memo, Peter Wehner, President Bush’s director of strategic
initiatives, declared,
I don’t need to tell you that this will be one of the most important
conservative undertakings of modern times. If we succeed in
reforming Social Security, it will rank as one of the most
significant conservative governing achievements ever. The scope
and scale of this endeavor are hard to overestimate.
. . .
As you know, our advocacy for personal accounts is tied to our
commitment to an Ownership Society — one in which more
103 Jefferson, supra note 58, at 1315 (“Whether these individuals [who depend
on Social Security to keep them out of poverty] would accumulate sufficient
amounts for retirement in their individual savings accounts would be determined
by an element of chance.”). Cf. Diamond and Orszag, supra note 22, at 39
(describing Social Security social purpose as one of “providing a basic, assured
level of financial security during retirement or disability or after the death of a
family’s wage earner.”). 
104 This is not to suggest that the current Social Security system is risk-free.
But risks are shared broadly across society under the current system while each
individual would be required to bear the risks alone under a system of personal
accounts. Cf. Aaron and Shoven, supra note 32, at 68 (“The key point is simple:
risk is inescapable. The practical question is: how should it be shared? Under a
defined-contribution approach, each worker/retiree must bear these risks alone.
Under a defined-benefit approach like social insurance these risks are shared more
broadly across society.”) 
105 See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 509 (“The strength of the defined contribu-
tion paradigm is further confirmed by the many individual account proposals
receiving serious consideration today from policymakers and analysts. These
proposals (as well as those possibilities beyond the bounds of current debate)
demonstrate the extent to which the individual account model defines the
parameters of contemporary public discussion of tax and social policy.”). 
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people will own their health care plans and have the confidence
of owning a piece of their retirement. Our goal is to provide a
path to greater opportunity, more freedom, and more control for
individuals over their own lives. That is what the personal
account debate is fundamentally about — and it is clearly the
crucial new conservative idea in the history of the Social Security
debate.
. . .
For the first time in six decades, the Social Security battle is one
we can win — and in doing so, we can help transform the political
and philosophical landscape of the country. We have it within
our grasp to move away from dependency on government and
toward giving greater power and responsibility to individuals.106
The current Social Security system is a system of “social
insurance, enacted pursuant to Congress’ power to “spend money
in aid of the ‘general welfare.’ ”107 The essential purpose of social
insurance “is to prevent hardship, poverty, or dependence that might
be caused by the contingencies covered wherever and whenever
these might occur among workers able to join their employers and
the government in a national program.”108 Collective action109 and
solidarity110 lie at the very heart of social insurance.111 
106 Memo on Social Security, supra note 20. 
107 Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609, rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960),
quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). 
108 J. Douglas Brown, Essays on Social Security 57–58 (1977). 
109 See E. J. Dionne, Why Social Insurance?, National Academy of Social Insur-
ance Social Security Brief No. 6 4 (1999) (“The basic ideas behind Social Security,
the need for collective provision against certain forms of insecurity, remain deeply
and broadly popular despite the rise of the ideology of privatization.”) 
110 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937) (“The purge of nation-wide
calamity that began in 1929 has taught us many lessons. Not the least is the
solidarity of interests that may once have seemed to be divided.”). 
111 Ted Marmor and Jerry Mashaw, Private ownership, collective default: The
Bush proposals for Social Security are about dismantling the current system —
and not saving it Newsday A31, 2005 WLNR 325149 (Jan. 9, 2005) (Social
Security “is about social solidarity. It is built on the understanding that we run
common risks that can be ameliorated only by collective action. And by making
everyone a contributor as well as a recipient it affirms that we recognize our
common fate and our obligations of both self and mutual support.”) 
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President Bush’s vision of an ownership society is the very
antithesis of social insurance. It emphasizes individual risk and
individual reward. As Henry Rogers Seeger wrote in 1910,
Up to a certain point, it is moral and commendable for each to
look after his own interests and the interests of those dependent
upon him. . . . But along with our individual interests which can
best be cared for by individual enterprise, industry, and fore-
thought, there are other interests that call for a collective and
cooperative action.112 
Adequate income in old age remains one of the interests that calls
for collective and cooperative action. President Bush’s personal
security accounts would negate the collective and cooperation
action that lie at the very heart of the current Social Security system.
Indeed, President Bush and other supporters of personal retirement
accounts have distanced themselves from the terms “privatization
of Social Security”113 and “private” retirement accounts114 because
of their negative connotations.115 But whether these accounts are
112 See Dionne, supra note 104, at 1–2, quoting Henry Rogers Seeger, Social
Insurance (1910). 
113 Cf. Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, Gephardt Statement Urging Colleagues to
Sign Petition to Open Debate on Social Security Privatization, 2002 TNT 196-42
(Oct. 9, 2002) (declaring that “one Republican pollster presentation advised his
clients, don’t use the word ‘privatize’ when you talk about Social Security on the
campaign trail. Get a new word, he said: maybe personalize, maybe traumatize.
I don’t know what the right word is, but it sure isn’t privatization.”). See also
Rep. E. Clay Shaw, Jr., Shaw Praise, Criticism of Daschle’s Social Security Stance
2002 TNT 163-23 (July 16, 2002) (Republican Shaw contends that “no Republican
plan that has been offered ‘privatizes’ Social Security. In fact, my plan leaves
Social Security totally intact. It also adds the opportunity for workers to choose
ownership and control of a personal account while guaranteeing current law
benefits regardless of the account’s investment performance.”). 
114 See, e.g., Phone campaign alarms backers of Social Security reform, Capito
among the targets of anonymous, automated messages, Charleston Daily Mail
(WV) 13A 2005 WLNR 1224124 (Jan. 28, 2005) (“Shaw supports personal
investment accounts, but he issued a statement saying that he does not support
privatizing Social Security.” An aide said the congressman believes that the use
of the word ‘private’ is inaccurate. Many proponents of the accounts prefer to
use the phrase ‘personal accounts,’ in part because some believe the term ‘private’
unsettles voters.”) 
115 Cf. Martin Feldstein, Introduction, in Privatizing Social Security 1, 2 (Martin
Feldstein, ed. 1998) (“Before going further, a word about the term privatizing social
security is in order. The term privatize is ambiguous and raises political objections
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called personal or private, they attack the basic principles of
community that undergird our current Social Security system.
if it suggests an abrogation of government responsibility for the income of the
aged. In this volume, privatizing social security refers to the shift from unfunded
pay-as-you-go programs to mandatory funded programs with individual ac-
counts.”). 
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